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FRAUD-ON-THE-FDA & BUCKMAN-THE
EVOLVING LAW OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Most manufacturers would believe that compliance with a federal regulation
would preclude any chance of liability, especially when a plaintiff attempts to bring
a state law claim. However, this has been an area of confusion in the products
liability context. Courts normally hold that compliance with a federal regulation is
only evidence of a manufacturer's due care.' Thus, the issue is whether a
preemptive provision of a federal statute should override any or all state law claims
brought by plaintiffs.
The United States Supreme Court has spoken on preemption in the products
liability area beginning with its landmark decision Cipollonev. Liggett Group,Inc.2
Subsequent decisions regarding automotive safety in FreightlinerCorp. v. Myric 3
and Geierv. American HondaMotor Co.4 have failed to provide lower courts with
constructive guidance. As was demonstrated in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,5 the
Supreme Court has struggled to interpret the preemptive provision of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act6 as amended by the Medical Device Amendments.7 The
latest Supreme Court decision, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'LegalCommittee,8 does
not appearto shedmuch light onthis preemptive confusion. The Courtused implied
preemption principles in its analysis and failed to clarify when express preemption
would be appropriate. 9 Consequently, the Buckman decision does not provide lower
courts with much direction outside of fraud-on-the-FDA claims. The states appear
to be interpreting the Buckman decision narrowly; thus, the Court's decision to
preempt the fraud-on-the-FDA claims will not automatically apply to other state
law claims.'0
Part II of this Comment describes general federal preemption principles, and
Part III details the Supreme Court's approach to determining whether federal
preemption exists. Part IV introduces the Medical Device Amendments as well as
the Medtronic decision and discusses the circuit court confusion that resulted from
conflicting Supreme Court decisions. Part V introduces the Buckman decision, and

1. See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCrS LABiLiTy AND SAFETY 390 (3d ed. 1996).
2. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
3. 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
4. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
5. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
6. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994).
7. Id. § 360(k).
8. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
9. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part VII.A.
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Part VI interprets that decision. Part VII reports the impact that Buckman has had
on the lower courts as well as on the current preemption position.
II.BACKGROUND
A. Preemption Generally
Article VI of the United States Constitution states in part that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 1"
According to the Tenth Amendment, "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."'" A state's police power is a reserved power. 3
Police powers allow states to regulate matters related to health and safety. 4 Issues
of preemption and federalism often arise when Congress legislates in areas covered
by the states' police powers. For example, Congress has increasingly legislated in
the field of health care.' 5 Courts addressing these issues normally presume against
preemption, and they also look to the language of the statute as well as to
congressional intent for guidance.'6

11. U.S. CONST. art. V'I,
el.2.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. X;see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,406 (1819)
(Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he government of the United States, then, though limited in its
powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance ofthe [C]onstitution, form the supreme law
of the land.").
13. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000).
14. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,475 (1996).
15. Id. (stating that "[d]espite the prominence of the States in matters ofpublic health and safety,
in recent decades the Federal Government has played an increasingly significant role in the protection
of the health of our people").
16. See 2 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 28.1, at 884 (3d
ed. 2000) ("A party advancing the defense of federal preemption must overcome an established
presumption against federal preemption of state law.") [hereinafter 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS
LIABILrrY].
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B. Express andImplied PreemptionDefined
The federal government can preempt state common law, regulation, or statutory
law through either a federal statute or regulation. 17 Federal preemption is divided
into two broad categories-express and implied."8 Express preemption is
determined by looking solely to the express language of the statute, while implied
preemption is analyzed by considering the statutory language as well as
congressional intent."
Implied preemption is further divided into two subcategories-field and
conflict. Field preemption occurs when Congress enacts a specific statute with the
intent that the statute will "effectively and functionally occupy the safety field."20
Problems occur when a state law or regulation purports to enter the field, and
preemption may then be warranted.' Conflict preemption arises when there is a
direct conflict between federal and state law; in such a situation, federal law
prevails.'
C. Statutes RaisingPreemptionIssues
Preemption issues have arisen when several federal statutes that affect state
regulation of health and safety have been enacted. Some federal statutes have
caused preemption problems for several years, while newly enacted statutes and
regulations pose new, novel problems to the courts. Examples of federal statutes
that may trigger preemption include those regulating the following: tobacco
labeling;23 pesticide, herbicide, and rodenticide
labeling;24 motor vehicle safety;
28
6
others.
and
boating;'
medical devices;

17. 4Louis R. FRUMER&MELVINI. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 24.01[1], at 24-3 (2001)
[hereinafter 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN].
18. See 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LiABiLriY, supra note 16, §§ 28.1-.2.
19. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,516 (1992); see also 2 MADDEN& OWEN
ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supranote 16, § 28.1, at 883 (defining express preemption as "textual" and

implied preemption as "contextual").
20. 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 16, § 28.2, at 885.
21. Id.
22. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.

23. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1965);
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
24. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000).
25. National Traffic and MotorVehicle SafetyActof 1966,15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b) (1994)).
26. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1994).
27. Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA), 46 U.S.C.A. § 4306 (West Supp. 2001).
28. See, e.g., Consumer Products Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (1994); Federal
Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA), 15 U.S.C. § 1261(b) (1994); Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1994); Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (1994).
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III. SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENT

A. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,29 a
monumental decision within the area of products liability.3" In Cipollone, the
plaintiff brought an action against defendant tobacco manufacturers for (1) breach
of an express warranty in advertising, (2) failure to warn consumers about smoking
hazards, (3) fraudulent misrepresentation of the smoking hazards to consumers, and
(4) conspiring to deprive the public of medical and scientific information regarding
smoking.3' Defendants claimed that both the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
33
Advertising Act 32 and its successor, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act,
preempted petitioner's state law claims. 4 The Court held that the plaintiff's claims
were only partially preempted and that federal law did not entirely protect the
defendants from all claims.3 5
The Court stated that "the pre-emptive scope of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act
[was] governed entirely by the express language in ...each Act. 36 The Court
rejected the petitioner's argument that the 1969 Act's preemption provision did not
reach common law actions, stating that "the phrase '[n]o requirement or
prohibition' swe[pt] broadly and suggest[ed] no distinction between positive
enactments and common law." 37Ultimately, the Court concluded that the 1969 Act
did not preempt all state common
law claims; its preemptive provision was entitled
38
to a "fair but narrow reading.,
With respect to the 1969 Act, the Court held that the plaintiff s failure-to-warn
claim was preempted because it relied on a state law "'requirement or
prohibition.., with respect to ...advertising or promotion,"' which was covered
by the 1969 Act.39The Court further held that the breach-of-express-warranty claim

29.
30.
31.
32.

505 U.S. 504 (1992).
4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, § 24.02, at 24-12.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. IV 1965). The preemptive provision stated:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by... this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
Id. § 1334(a)-(b).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994). The new preemption provision under the 1969 Act stated that
"(b) [n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law
with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this Chapter." Id. § 1334(b).
34. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 510.
35. Id. at 530-31.
36. Id. at 517.
37. Id. at 521 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994)).
38. Id. at 523-24.
39. Id. at 524.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss3/9

4

Kirk: Fraud-on-the-FDA &(and) Buckman - The Evolving Law of Federal Pre
2002]

PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW

was not preempted because the claim arose from the manufacturer's statements or
its voluntary undertakings in its advertisements rather than from any "impos[ition]
under state law."' Additionally, the Court found that the first theory of the
plaintiff s fraudulent misrepresentation claim, which alleged that the defendant's
advertising neutralized the effect of federally mandated warning labels, was
preempted by the 1969 Act.4 However, the Court held that the plaintiff's second
misrepresentation theory-that the defendants made false statements and concealed
material information-was not preempted because the theory rested on a state law
duty not to deceive which did not arise from advertising or promotions. 42 Finally,
the Court held that the plaintiff's claim alleging a conspiracy by the defendants to
misrepresent or to conceal material facts concerning the health hazards of smoking
was not 43preempted because the conspiracy was not "'based on smoking and
health."'
Before Cipollone was decided, it appeared that most courts rejected express
preemption claims and relied on implied preemption in interpreting federal
statutes.' However, as discussed above, the Cipollone Court used express
preemption to determine whether state law claims were preempted.4' Three years
after Cipollone, the FreightlinerCorp. v. Myick decision put a new spin on the
Supreme Court's recent decision.'
B. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick
Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966'7
to prevent traffic accidents and injuries and drafted a preemption provision48 and
saving clause.4 9 The plaintiffs in Myrick brought negligent design claims for the
defendant's failure to install an antilock braking system in tractor-trailers. 0 The

Cipollone,505 U.S. at 526-27.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 528-29.
Id. at 530.
OWEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 408.
See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) states:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this
subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any
authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor
vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the
same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not
identical to a Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as
preventing any State from enforcing any safety standard which is identical to the
Federal safety standard.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) states that "[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety
standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common
law."
50. Myrick, 514 U.S. at 282-83.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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Court reasoned that because the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
suspended the regulation requiring certain stopping distances for trucks, the
plaintiffs' claims could not be expressly preempted. 5 In the alternative, the Court
considered the defendant's implied preemption argument because itwas reasonable
to interpret Cipollone as approving the use of implied preemption in some
circumstances.52 However, this argument failed because there was no federal statute
to comply with; therefore, the plaintiffs' claims would not frustrate "federal
objectives or purposes with respect to [braking] devices." 3
After Cipollone, it appeared that the Court was willing to preempt state law
claims only if there was an express federal provision on point. Myrick changed this
outlook dramatically. As one commentator stated, "[t]he unanimous decision in
Myrick, it is seen, foreshadowed apotential reinvigoration ofthe doctrine ofimplied
preemption."54
C. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,55 the Court once again faced the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.56 The Court adopted a three-part
test for determining whether the plaintiff's claims were preempted: (1) "[did] the
Act's express pre-emption provision pre-empt this lawsuit?"; (2) "[did] ordinary
pre-emption principles nonetheless apply?"; and (3) "[did] this lawsuit actually
conflict with [the Act's objectives], hence with the Act itself? 5 7
As to the first prong of its test, the Court held that the savings clause would
prevent preemption of the plaintiffs claims by forcing the preemptive provision to
be read narrowly.-" However, as to the Court's second prong, it concluded that "the
savings clause (like the express pre-emption provision) [did] not bar the ordinary
working of conflict pre-emption principles." 59 Regarding the last prong, the Court
held that "[b]ecause the rule oflaw for which petitioners contend would have stood
'as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the important means''60
related federal objectives [of the Act], it was pre-empted.

51. Id. at 289.
52. Id. at 288 ("The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute
'implies'-i.e., supports a reasonable inference-that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other
matters does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied preemption.").
53. Id. at 289-90.
54. M. Stuart Madden, FederalPreemption ofInconsistent State Safety Obligations,21 PACE
L. REv. 103, 137 (2000).
55. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988); see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
57. Geier, 529 U.S. at 867.
58. Id. at 868. The savings clause stated that mere compliance with a federal safety standard
would not exempt a defendant from liability under common law. Id. Thus, the clause "assumed that
there [were] some.., common-law liability cases to save." Id.
59. Id. at 869.
60. Id. at 881 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss3/9
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Based on the Court's holding in Geier, the implied preemption doctrine
appeared to be shifting away from the view taken in Cipolloneand toward the view
taken in Myrick.6' However, the task of interpreting the Medical Device
Amendments and the accompanying preemptive provision harshly tested this trend.
IV. THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS AND THE FDA

A. Background of the MedicalDevice Amendments
In 1906, Congress enacted the Food and Drug Act to guard "against the
manufacture or shipment in interstate commerce of any adulterated or misbranded
food or drug. '62 In 1938, the Act was expanded to "include misbranded or
adulterated medical devices and cosmetics. That same year, Congress passed the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),6 which was amended in 1976 by
the Medical Device Amendments (MDA). 65 The MDA was enacted specifically to
provide for "'the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human
use.' ' The enactment of the MDA was prompted by problems occurring with the
"Dalkon Shield" and with other medical devices. 67 The FDCA provides an express
provision governing preemption:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device,
and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device
or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device under this chapter.68

61. Recall that in Cipollone the Court focused on an express preemption analysis under the
Public Heath Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. See supranotes 36-38 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, in Myrick the Court failed to find preemption, but hinted that even the presence of an
express preemption clause will not "foreclose[] any possibility of implied preemption." Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,288 (1995).
62. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,475 (1996).
63. Id.
64. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994).
65. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.
(1994)).
66. 4 FRUMER&FRiEDMAN,supranote 17, § 24.05[4][b], at 24-59 (quoting 90 Stat. 539 (1976)
(preamble)).
67. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 476 (discussing the Dalkon Shield and other medical devices that
posed risks to thepublic, which prompted the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to enact the MDA
in 1976).
68. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
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Subsection (b) of the preemption provision contains an exemption from the
general rule outlined in subsection (a):
(b) Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof,
the Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and
opportunity for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a)
of this section, under such conditions as may be prescribed in
such regulation, a requirement of such State or political
subdivision applicable to a device intended for human use
if(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement
under this chapter which would be applicable to the
device if an exemption were not in effect under this
subsection; or
(2) the requirement(A) is required by compelling local conditions,
and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not
cause the device to be in violation of any
applicable requirement under this chapter. 9
The FDA, which has the power under the FDCA to approve medical devices
before they are placed on the market,7" has interpreted the FDCA and has provided
limited exceptions to its preemption provision:
(d) State or local requirements are preempted only when the
[FDA] has established specific counterpart regulations or
there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular
device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent
State or local requirements applicable to the device different
from, or in addition to, the specific [FDA] requirements.
There are other State or local requirements that affect devices
that are not preempted by ... the act because they are not
"requirements applicable to a device" within the meaning
of... the act.7
Under the MDA, the FDA has statutory procedures that it follows before it
approves a medical device for public use. The FDA first divides medical devices
into three categories--Class I, II, and 111.72 Medical devices within Class I pose no
unreasonable risk of illness or injury and are subject)to minimal regulation by

69. Id. § 360k(b).

70. See id. § 360.
71. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2001); see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (1994).
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"general controls."'73 Class II devices are potentially more harmful than Class I
devices and thus are subject to "special-controls" regulations.74 Finally, Class HI
devices "present[] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury" or are
"purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or
for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health." 75 Examples of Class III devices include hip and knee replacement
components, intraocular lenses, and pacemakers.76
Because of their increased risk, Class III medical devices require a premarket
approval (PMA) process to provide "reasonable assurance of [their] safety and
effectiveness. '77 PMA requires the manufacturer of the device to submit
information to the FDA regarding its safety.78 However, there are three recognized
exceptions to the vigorous and time-consuming PMA process. First, a
"grandfathering" provision under the MDA allows devices manufactured prior to
its enactment to remain on the market.79 Second, in order to ensure a level playing
field between grandfathered devices' manufacturers and current medical devices'
manufacturers, the MDA provides that certain current devices that are "substantially
equivalent" to pre-existing devices can speed through the PMA process via a
§ 5 10(k) notification.80 This notification process is the typical way in which medical
devices are approved."' The third exception is based on the investigational device
exemption (IDE), whereby a medical device may avoid the PMA process through
human testing.82 According to the federal statute, investigational devices are
to the extent consistent with the protection of public
exempted "'to encourage ....
health and safety and with ethical standards, the discovery and development of
useful devices intended for human use."' 83
B. Interpretingthe MDA-Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
Medtronic,Inc. v. Lohr addressed the preemptive scope of the FDCA and the
MDA. At the time the case was decided, there was confusion as to whether the
FDCA's preemptive provision trumped state common law claims." The plaintiffs
brought an action against the manufacturer ofpacemaker leads, which had been preapproved under § 510(k) of the FDCA, for negligent design and manufacture and

73. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
74. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B).

75. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
76. 21 C.F.R. § 870.3610 (2001).

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
Id.
Id. § 360e(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 360e(b)(1)(B).
4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, § 24.05[4][d], at 24-67.
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a)).

83. 2 MADDEN & O\VEN ON PRODUCTs LIABILrrY, supra note 16, § 28.7, at 918 (quoting 21

U.S.C. § 360j(g)).
84. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,484 (1996).
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for failure to warn of the pacemaker's dangers, as well as for strict liability.85 The
Supreme Court held that federal law did not preempt the plaintiff's claims.86
The Court rejected Medtronic's argument that "any common-law cause of
action is a 'requirement' which alters incentives and imposes duties 'different from,
or in addition to,' the generic federal standards that the FDA has promulgated." 87
The Court distinguished Cipollone, where it had held that common law claims
could be preempted,88 stating that "[the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969] did not sweep nearly as broadly as Medtronic would have us believe that [the
'
MDA] does."89
The MDA's legislative history indicated that the Act was directed
at the risk of additional federal and state administrative regulation, rather than at the
danger ofpre-existing duties under common law.90 Furthermore, the Court held that
the plaintiffs design claim was not preempted because under the "substantially
equivalent" standard, Congress intended only to level the playing field in
competition, not to set safety and design requirements. 9 ' The Court refused to
believe that the preemptive provision of the FDCA would prevent a state from
enacting additional or different "requirements" with respect to medical devices
when these state requirements were stricter than the federal requirements.92
Ultimately, the Court concluded that state regulations, general in nature, were not
preempted because they were not enacted to govern a specific medical device.9 3
The Medtronic decision provided few answers to the then-existing preemptive
confusion.94 The plurality opinion failed to clarify the most essential issue
governing preemption-whether state law claims can ever be preempted. Justice
Stevens, writing for the plurality inMedtronic,concluded that state law claims were
not a"requirement" under the MDA so as to invoke preemption.95 Justice O'Connor
and four other Justices felt that a state law claim was a "requirement" sufficient to
be preempted by federal law.96 Justice Breyer, while concurring in the judgment that
the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted, nevertheless opined that a state claim
could be classified as a "requirement," thus agreeing with O'Connor's reasoning.'
Despite the shift in Myrick toward a possible implied preemption analysis, the
Medtronic Court swung back toward the express preemption framework that was

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 480-81.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 486-87; see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992).
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 488.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 493-94; see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 495.
Id. at 499-500.
See Madden, supra note 54, at 137.
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487-88.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 503-04.
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established in Cipollone." As a result, circuit courts would not fare well in their
attempts to interpret the decision in Medtronic.
C. Circuit Court Holdings on Preemption-Demonstratingthe Confusion
Createdby the Supreme Court
1.

Post-Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.

In King v. Collagen Corp., the First Circuit Court of Appeals used Cipollone
in its analysis, determining that an express preemption framework under the MDA
was appropriate and that the plaintiff's claims were preempted. 99 In Talbottv. C.R.
Bard,Inc., the First Circuit again relied on Cipollone and followed King in holding
that an express preemption analysis encompassed state law tort claims, both
statutory and common law.1"' Furthermore, in Stamps v. Collagen Corp., the Fifth
Circuit employed a similar approach, holding that a lack of direct conflict between
federal and state law did not prevent preemption because the court was required to
conduct an express preemption analysis under Cipollonewhen there was a federal
statute on point.'0 ' In Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., the Third Circuit cited
Cipollone, King, and Stamps, in ruling that the plaintiff's state law claims were
expressly preempted under the MDA. °2
In Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., the Ninth Circuit rejected the other Courts of
Appeals' findings that the MDA's preemption provision swept broadly, instead
holding that the statute should be read narrowly.0 3 The court declared that "[s]tate
common law is a law of general applicability"; therefore, under 21 C.F.R.
§ 808.1(d), which exempts laws not directed at specific devices from preemption,
such claims should not be preempted.'

98. See Madden, supra note 54, at 147 ("In Medtronic, the Court appeared to build on its
analysis in Cipollone, focusing on express and not implied preemption analysis.").
99. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135 (1st Cir. 1993).
100. Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25,27 (lst Cir. 1995). One defendant had pleaded guilty
in an earlier criminal trial for fraud committed on the FDA, but the court held that there were no
exceptions to the preemption clause, even when a manufacturer failed to comply with the MDA. Id.
at 28.
101. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1425 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Reeves v.
Acromed Corp., 44 F.3d 300,304-05 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim
was preempted based on their holding in Stamps v. Collagen Corp.).
102. Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540,542,545 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Michael v.
Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316,1324-25 (3d Cir. 1995) (determining that the plaintiff's breach-of-impliedwarranty claim was preempted while his breach-of-express-warranty claim was not because it was
created by the parties and not by state law); English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477,480 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that under Gile and Michael,the plaintiffs' strict liability, negligence, and implied warranty
claims were preempted, but their express warranty claim was not preempted under the MDA's express
provisions).
103. Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
104. Id. at 1459; see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Post-Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr

Medtronic's plurality decision offered little hope that unified decisions would
result. In Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., the Seventh Circuit made a point to
distinguish Medtronic, where the Supreme Court had held that the state commonlaw claims were not preempted by the MDA, and stated that "the Medironic
disposition must be read as acknowledging that at least some state-based common
law causes of action" fall within the MDA's preemptive scope." 5
In stark contrast to the holding in Mitchell, in Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., the
Eleventh Circuit refused to preempt the plaintiff's state law claims.1"6 Though it
reached the same result as Medtronic, the court stated:
Despite the striking superficial similarity of the cases, the
Supreme Court's disposition of [Medtronic] provides little more
than a rudimentary analytical framework to guide our resolution
of Medtronic's preemption claims in this case because... [in
Medtronic,] the Court fractured in an all but irreconcilable manner
over the extent to which section 360k(a)
would ever preempt a
0 7
general state common law tort claim.
In Kemp v. Medtronic,Inc., the Sixth Circuit identified the split resulting from
the decision in Medtronic,Inc. v. Lohr, stating that "[t]his appeal presents fractious
issues which have sharply divided the various circuit courts which have considered
them."' ' This reasoning received support from the Fifth Circuit, which chose to
follow its own precedent and noted that "the Supreme Court's fractured
ruling... does nothing to upset [the Fifth Circuit's] binding authority."'0 9
In sum, the decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr was creating grave confusion
within the circuit courts. There was a clear dichotomy in the courts' interpretation
of the preemptive provision of the MDA. The courts definitely needed proper
direction.
V. BUCKMAN Co. v. PLAINTIFFS'LEGAL COMMITTEE
A.

Facts

The facts of Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee" ° developed as
follows: Acromed Corporation was formed to develop an orthopedic device for

105. Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902,907,910 (7th Cir. 1997); see supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
106. Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1382 (11 th Cir. 1999).
107. Id. at 1371.
108. Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216,221 (6th Cir. 2000).

109. See Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 584-85 (5th Cir. 2001).
110. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
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implantation within the spine, formally termed the Variable Screw Placement
Spinal Plate Fixation System."' The precise medical technology involved plates
fixed with screws into the patients' spine to aid in spinal fusion. 2 Approximately
one year after Acromed was formed, it initiated a relationship with the Buckman
Company in order to achieve § 510(k) authorization." 3 Following Buckman's
initial representation to the FDA that the device was to be used in spinal fusion, the
FDA informed Buckman on two separate occasions that there was no "substantial
equivalence" to any currently-approved device, which would have allowed the
companies to expedite the onerous premarket approval process." 4 Subsequently,
Buckman held a meeting with Acromed and the FDA and proceeded to submit
separate premarket notifications for the plates and for the screws." 5 The FDA
subsequently approved the plates and screws as substantially equivalent to existing
Class II medical devices which were used to repair the long bones of the arms and
legs." 6 However, "[t]he representations made by Buckman to the FDA were false
and misleading" because Buckman never intended to use the plate and screws
solely for fractures in the long bones, but also intended to implant them in the
spine.' '7Subsequently, the FDA determined that Buckman and Acromed committed
fraud in obtaining approval for a substantially equivalent device."'
Following a television program describing the problems resulting from the
implantation ofpedicle screws, such as those manufactured by Acromed, thousands
of plaintiffs filed complaints alleging injuries against hundreds of defendants; the
complaints were subsequently consolidated." 9 Plaintiffs' Legal Committee sued
Acromed and Buckman, alleging state fraud-on-the-FDA claims. 2 ' The plaintiffs
claimed the defendants made fraudulent representations to the FDA concerning the
intended use of the screws and were therefore improperly given § 510(k) expedited
premarket clearance.' Additionally, the "[p]laintiffs further claim[ed] that such
representations were at least a 'but for' cause of injuries that plaintiffs sustained
from the implantation of these devices."'" The district court determined that the
plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the FDCA, but the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that neither express nor implied preemption
applied."u

S111.
Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001)
(No. 98-1768).
112. Id. at7.
113. Id.; see supranote 80 and accompanying text.
114. Respondent's Brief at 7, Buclanan (No.98-1768).
115. Id.
at 8.
116. Id.
at 9.
117. Id.
118. Id.
at 10.
119. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (No.
98-1768).
120. Buckmnan, 531 U.S. at 346-47.
121. Id.at343.
122. Id.
123. Inre Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 818-19 (3d Cir. 1998).
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B. Supreme CourtAnalysis
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of
appeals regarding the issue of whether the plaintiffs' state law claims were either
expressly or impliedly preempted. 24 The Court reversed the Third Circuit's
decision, holding that the state fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflicted with the FDCA
and were therefore impliedly preempted. 2 ' In so holding, the Court stated that the
preemption stemmed from the federal statutory scheme which gave the FDA the
power to punish and deter fraud and which was used "to achieve a somewhat
delicate balance of statutory objectives."' 26 Thus, permitting the plaintiffs' claims
would create an additional burden upon applicants for § 510(k) approvals because
the state claims would "conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police fraud
consistently with [its] judgment and objectives.', 127 Also, allowing the state law
claims would deter § 510(k) or "off-label" usage because applicants would fear
exposure to civil liability. 2 1 Further, the Court determined that allowing the
plaintiffs' claims would cause applicants to fear that their disclosures to the FDA
would later be determined to be inadequate in state court, even if the FDA deemed
the disclosures sufficient. 9 The Court distinguishedMedtronic on the grounds that
it was decided under an express preemption analysis which was applied to the
manufacture of the device, while in the present case an implied preemption analysis
was applied to a violation of FDCA requirements. 30
3
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion.' '
Stevens relied on the fact that the FDA had not reacted to the fraud-on-the-FDA
claim by removing the device from the market, which implied that the claim could
not be proved.3 2 However, Stevens felt that the Court's decision was harsh in not
allowing any state tort claims for fraud even if33the FDA had reacted to the claim;
therefore, he concurred only in the judgment.
VI. DID BUCKMAN CLARIFY THE CONFUSION?

A. Explanation of the Supreme CourtDecision
Buckman clarified Medtronic to the extent that it held that state law claims
could be preempted. One oddity of the Buckman decision is that the Court ruled

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347.
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352.
Id. at 353-55.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 355.
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unanimously, whereas inMedtronicit was harshly divided.' The Court also relied
on implied preemption as opposed to the express preemption analysis it adopted in
Medtronicand Cipollone.35 Interestingly, the Court stated that the plaintiffs' fraudon-the-FDA claims were impliedly preempted, but "express[ed] no view on whether
the[] claims [were] subject to express pre-emption under 21 U.S.C. § 360k."136 As
one commentator opined, "[u]nfortunately, by applying implied rather than express
preemption, the Court137 passed on an opportunity to clarify the fragmented
[Medtronic] decision."'
As amicus curiae, the United States seemed to influence the holding in
Buckman substantially, and its arguments provide more insight into the Court's
decision. 3 1 The United States' brief noted that both devices in Buckman and
Medtronicwere approved as substantially equivalent under § 510k, and it followed
Medtronic's reasoning in arguing that the plaintiffs' claims should be impliedly
rather than expressly preempted.'39 Further, the United States argued that under
Medtronic, the federal requirement had to be both "specific" and the state
requirement "different from, or in addition to," that specific federal requirement for
express preemption to be appropriate.'" Because there were specific federal
requirements for hearing aids, cables and leads, impact-resistant lenses, and devices
containing natural rubber, the United States argued that the § 510k process, by
contrast, was not specific because it applied to all medical devices generally.'
The United States argued that under implied conflict preemption principles, the
plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-FDA claims were preempted.' 42 First, the United States
differentiated Medtronic by arguing that in that case the plaintiffs' claims were
related to the actual design of the device, while in Buckman the plaintiffs were
challenging the way in which the FDA approved the device, which was an area of
"preeminent federal concern."' 43 The brief further stated that "[i]f federal
regulatory agencies are to perform the important functions assigned to them by
Congress, they must have the ability to decide, free from hindrances imposed by
state law, how best to obtain the information they need and how to sanction those
who fail to provide such information."'" Additionally, the United States noted that

134. See supranotes 95-97 and accompanying text.
135. See Madden, supra note 54, at 147.
136. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348 n.2.
137. Raymond M. Williams & Anita Jain, Preemption of State "Fraud-on-the-FDA" Claims,
FOR THE DEF., June 2001, at 23, 25.
138. Id.
139. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Buckman v.
Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (No. 98-1768).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 12.
142. Id. at 16-17 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)).
143. Id. at 17.
144. Id. at 18.
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the FDA has several methods of controlling fraud; 45 therefore, the brief concluded
that state requirements governing fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflict with federal
requirements because the FDA is best equipped to determine if it has been
defrauded. 6 Allowing state fraud-on-the-FDA claims to stand, the United States
contended, would result in nonuniformity between states in determining whether
fraud has been committed; the remedies sought would differ, and there would be
interference with the "FDA's discretion
to decide which of the statutorily prescribed
47
remedies, if any, to pursue.'
The Buckman holding failed to specify whether preemption analysis differs
based on the manner in which a device is appeared. Earlier circuit court decisions
disagreed on this issue. In Feldtv. Mentor Corp. andReeves v. Acromed Corp., the
Fifth Circuit held that the way in which the devices were approved was irrelevant
to the preemption analysis. 41 Similarly, the Third Circuit held that MDA
regulations were requirements, notwithstanding the manner in which the device was
approved.'49 InBecker v. OpticalRadiationCorp.,the Second Circuit also held that
even though the FDA approved the device at issue as an "experimental device," the
plaintiffs' claims were preempted. 5 ' However, in Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., the
Ninth Circuit adopted the minority position, holding that the PMA process was not
specific enough to warrant preemption.' 5' Even subsequent to the Medtronic
decision, the Sixth Circuit held that the experimental device requirements

145. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (prohibiting fraudulent statements to federal agencies);
21 U.S.C. § 331(q)(2) (1994) (prohibiting fraudulent reports to the FDCA); id. § 372 (granting the
FDA authority to investigate alleged fraud committed against it); id. § 332, 333(f)(1)(A),
334(a)(2)(D), 333(a) (granting the FDA various punitive powers); 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2001) (allowing
any U.S. citizen to request that the FDA take action if the citizen believes that fraud has been
committed against the FDA).
146. United States' Brief at 21-24, Buckman (No. 98-1768).
147. Id. at 23-24.
148. Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431,435-36 (5th Cir. 1995); Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 44
F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1995). Despite the device's obtaining substantial equivalence, as opposed to
undergoing full-scale PMA, the court in Feldtheld that "[p]reemption does not depend on the route
the product takes to the market, but on whether there are any specific federal requirements applicable
to the device." Feldt, 61 F.3d at 435-36.
149. See English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the "substantial
equivalence" approval of the device did not change the analysis because general federal regulations
have preemptive effect under Stamps and King, and "the mere fact that the FDA has promulgated
regulations affecting groups ofdevices, rather than a specific type of device, should not alter whether
or not there is preemption"); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1324 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
specific FDA requirements for heart valves were not required to trigger preemption because the
defendant's heart valve was subject to "any requirement" under the MDA).
150. Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp., 66 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1995) ("While the FDA's
regulations impose no requirements concerning the design of [experimental devices], the FDA can
hardly be expected to specify the safe and effective design of a device when it is still experimental.
The point of the experiment is to find out whether the design is safe and effective.").
151. Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1995).
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promulgated by the FDA were specific and thus had preemptive effect.'52 Likewise,
in Mitchellv. Collagen Corp., the Seventh Circuit held that the PMA could qualify
as a specific federal requirement. 153 Finally, Goodlinv. Medtronic, Inc. adopted the
reasoning of Kennedy and held that the PMA process was not a specific federal
requirement. 54
The Court in Buckman seemed to justify implied preemption based on the
specific requirements the FDA imposes in the § 510k process, as well as on the
FDA's power to detect and remedy fraud, both of which conflict with similar state
requirements.' 55 However, as the United States' amicus curiae briefpointed out, the
56
§ 510k process is not specific because it applies to all medical devices generally.'
This reasoning would seem to apply regardless of which medical device approval
process is used because both the PMA and experimental device approval processes
apply to all medical devices generally.'57 Medtronic requires the imposition of a
specific federal requirement to justify preemption.'15 Further, in Kennedy, the Ninth
Circuit stated that "[t]he fact that the premarket approval process involves specific
requirements must not be confused with the premarket approval requirement itself
acting as a specific requirement."'"" The court went on to note that "[t]he potential
for state common law to create an indirect regulatory effect is insufficient to alter
the fact that state common law is a law of general applicability and therefore cannot
qualify as a specific requirement which may be preempted by the MDA.' 160
Similarly, in Goodlin v. Medtronic,Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that despite the
fact the PMA process requires assurances as to safety and effectiveness, it does not
constitute a requirement under the FDCA.' 6' After all, it is difficult to contend that
the PMA or the investigational device exemption (IDE), which apply to all medical

152. Martin v. Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1098-1101 (6th Cir. 1997).
Specifically, the court held that the plaintiff's manufacturing defect claim was preempted because the
FDA had specific requirements for investigating the manufacturing of experimental devices prior to
their being approved. Id. at 1099. The court further held that the plaintiff's design defect claim was
preempted because under the FDA's investigational device exception (IDE) approval process, the
"risks and benefits [of the device] were specifically reviewed and balanced in accordance with 21
C.F.R. § 812.30." Id. Additionally, the court preempted the plaintiff inadequate warning claim on the
basis that experimental or investigational devices have specific labeling requirements, unlike those
devices that are approved as "substantially equivalent." Id. at 1100. Finally, the court concluded that
the plaintiff's express warranty claim was preempted because "[e]xpress representations made about
investigational devices are subject to comprehensive FDA regulation." Id.
153. Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 911 (7th Cir. 1997) ("We agree that the PMA
process, as opposed to the 'substantially equivalent' process at issue in Medtronic, can constitute the
sort of specific federal regulation of a product that can have preemptive effect.").
154. Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1376 (1Ith Cir. 1999).
155. See supra Part V.B.
156. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, Buckman v.
Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (No. 98-1768).
157. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
158. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,486 (1996).
159. Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
160. Id.
161. Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999).
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devices generally, can be specific requirements. 6 2 Therefore, express preemption
is inappropriate. This
reasoning comports with the FDA's interpretation under 21
63
808.1(d).'
§
C.F.R.
If there is no express preemption, then implied preemption, either field or
conflict, is the only other way the state law claim can be preempted.)'" Some
commentators have claimed that the Court's fragmented decision in Medtronic
demonstrates that the PMA process would qualify as a specific requirement and
would thus justify preemption.' 6' However, Medtronic was hardly a one-sided
decision, and the circuit court's indecisiveness demonstrates that the specific
requirement debate is thriving.' 66 One could argue that Chief Justice Rehnquist's
statement in Buckman that "the § 510(k) process lacks the PMA review's rigor"
implies that the PMA process is specific."6 However, the Court conceded that the
§ 510(k) process does impose requirements despite its lack of rigor. 61 Thus, it is
unpersuasive to argue that because the PMA approval process involves an
abundance of requirements, such requirements are in fact specific to a particular
medical device. Other courts have agreed that the PMA process is not a specific
requirement that initiates federal preemption.'69

162. See Goodlin, 167 F.3d at 1377 ("We do not believe that requirements applicable to all
devices that receive the FDA's approval via the PMA process satisfy the Court's demand for a specific
requirement that applies to a particular device.").
163. Specifically, 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) orders preemption of state law "only when the [FDA]
has established specific counterpartregulationsor there are other specific requirements applicable
to a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements
applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific [FDA] requirements." 21 C.F.R.
§ 808.1(d) (2001) (emphasis added); see also Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1461 (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
(stating that "§ 808.1 makes it clear that general state tort law is not preempted by the MDA").
164. See supranotes 18-22 and accompanying text.
165. See John D. Burnside, Comment, Kennedy v. Collagen Corp.: Fallingfrom the Medical
Device Amendments'FederalPreemption Garden, 28 ARiz. ST. L.J. 949,971 (1996) (supporting the
holding in Kennedy, but conceding that the Medtronic decision suggests that the PMA process is a
specific requirement); see also Juliann L. Safko, Note, Massachusetts Sets Precedentfor the First
Circuit: The PremarketApprovalProcessofthe MedicalDeviceAmendment PreemptsState Common
Law Causes ofAction, 34 NEW. ENG. L. REv. 739, 757 (2000) ("[It is quite possible for the lower
courts to infer that a device undergoing the PMA process would have preemptory effect over a state
claim which involves a medical device that underwent the PMA process before being marketed.").
166. See 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, § 24.05[4][e], at 24-73 to -79 (identifying the
split between courts when determining whether federal preemption applies to investigational,
substantially equivalent, or PMA-approved devices).
167. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,348 (2001).
168. Id. at 348-49.
169. See 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, § 24.05[4][e], at 24-79 (citing several state
court decisions which have followed the reasoning of Goodlin and have found that the PMA process
does not have preemptive effect).
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B. Other Buckman Issues
A troubling aspect of the Buckman holding is that plaintiffs will be left with no
recourse if their state law claims are preempted. Justice Stevens and Justice
Thomas, concurring in the judgment, opined that under the Court's holding,
parties injured by fraudulent representations to federal agencies
[will] have no remedy even if recognizing such a remedy would
have no adverse consequences upon the operation or integrity of
the regulatory process. [We] do not believe the reasons advanced
in the Court's opinion support the conclusion that Congress
intended such a harsh result. 170
In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit likewise stated that
it is incredible to believe that Congress would, without comment,
void all means of relief for those injured by illegal
conduct.... [S]tate common law serves a different purpose than
state regulation and is unlikely to have been the target of
congressional attempts to promote the introduction of safe
medical devices onto the market17or even to curb dual regulation
of the medical devices industry.'
In Goodlin,the Eleventh Circuit adopted similar reasoning to that ofKennedy. 72 At
least one court has held that an express warranty claim is not preempted because
doing so would provide the plaintiff with no redress. 73 Commentators have agreed
that preempting all of the plaintiffs' claims would not comport with congressional
intent. The Buckman holding does not appear to imply that state claims other than
fraud-on-the-FDA will be preempted. Buckman did not rule on any claims related

170. Buckmnan, 531 U.S. at 355.

171. Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453,1459) (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). The court further stated that "[piremarket approval is
supposed to benefit consumers, not create a rose garden, free from liability, for manufacturers." Id.
at 1460.
172. See Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 1999) (identifying
congressional intent for support in its argument that preempting state law claims would leave plaintiffs
without any recourse).
173. Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1326 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The elimination of [express
warranty] claims might result in the elimination of all legal remedies to the purchaser.").
174. See Burnside, supra note 165, at 964 (stating that "construing the MDA to eliminate
compensatory remedies undercuts the MDA's consumer protection purpose"); see also Anne-Marie
Dega, Comment, The Battle over Medical Device Regulation: Do the FederalMedical Device
Amendments PreemptState Tort Law Claims?, 27 LoY.U.CHI.L.J. 615,659-61 (1996) (arguing that
leaving plaintiffs with no relief is against public policy because the remedies currently provided by
the MDA are entirely insufficient).
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to warning, manufacture, or design. 7 1 This dovetails with the position of the United
States, whose
amicus brief implied that state claims related to design should not be
17 6
preempted.

There is also the issue of the saving clause found within the FDCA. 177 As the
Court noted in Buckman, "neither an express pre-emption provision nor a saving
17
clause 'bar[s] the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles." 1
However, it is unclear whether the Court's statement applies to devices approved
under the PMA or where conflict preemption is not instituted. One commentator
stated that "[the saving clause] proves to be important, as it reveals a clearstatement
by Congress regarding a medical device manufacturer's potential liability under
state law."' 179 Furthermore, "its existence lends additional support to the conclusion
that Congress assumed device firms would remain civilly liable for device-related
defects."' 80 Additional support that Congress did not to intend to preempt all state
law claims is evidenced through a federalism debate concerning whether Congress
even considered preempting state law tort claims. 8 ' This debate further bolsters the
conclusion that the Buckman court did not intend to preempt all state law tort
claims.

175. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
176. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, Buckman v.
Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (No. 98-1768) (distinguishing Medtronic on the
grounds that the Buckman case involved challenging the FDA's approval process, while inMedtronic,
the state claim was based on questioning the design of the device).
177. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (1994) provides as follows:
Compliance with an order issued under this section shall not relieve any person
from liability underFederal orState law. In awarding damages for economic loss
in an action brought for the enforcement of any such liability, the value to the
plaintiff in such action of any remedy provided him under such order shall be
taken into account.
178. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,352 (2001) (quoting Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)) (alteration in original).
179. Dega, supranote 174, at 653; see also Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367,1378-79
(11 th Cir. 1999) (declaring that the presence of a saving clause expresses congressional intent not to
preempt state law claims and thus to leave plaintiffs without any recourse).
180. Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The PreemptionPentad: Federal Preemption of
Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 706 (1997); see also Robert S.
Adler & Richard A. Mann, PreemptionandMedicalDevices: The CourtsRun Amok, 59 Mo. L. REv.
895, 929 (1994) ("[The saving clause] explicitly indicates that a company's compliance with an FDA
recall order will not bar tort claims brought against it.").
181. See Dega, supranote 174, at 648-51, 655 (reasoning that Congress did not intend to include
state common law claims within the MDA's preemptive reach because Congress would have expressly
said so instead of using ambiguous language, and noting that the MDA's legislative history didnot
even address state tort law remedies); see also Betsy J. Grey, Make CongressSpeak Clearly: Federal
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REv. 559, 607-10 (1997) (stating that in preserving
federalism, "the Court has developed an interpretive guideline known as the 'clear statement' rule";
thus, before preemption can occur, the congressional intent must be entirely unambiguous).
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C. A CriticalAnalysis ofBuckman
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Buckman seems to comport with
congressional intent regarding fraud-on-the-FDA claims.82 By using implied rather
than expressed preemption, the Court arguably "dodged a bullet" with respect to the
split created inMedtronic.'83 Additionally, the reasoning employed makes common
sense and comports with decisions reached both post-Cipollone and postMedtronic.'8 Buckman stated that "[e]very other court of appeals to consider
whether preemption bars common-law actions raising agency-fraud claims
implicating federal administrative activity has found preemption.""'8 AfterBuckman
was denied, many commentators agreed with its reasoning, stating that allowing
such fraud-on-the-FDA claims would permit "second-guessing" of a federal
agency. 8 6 The First Circuit's decision in Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., though
controversial because the defendant admitted fraud but still prevailed on a
preemption defense, nevertheless comports with Buckman." 7 Talbottdemonstrates
that even a claim which demonstrates egregious fraud-on-the-FDA will most likely
be preempted.
Some commentators have opposed the Buckman decision, stating that it "'could
leave consumers out in the cold without any remedy."",18 Other commentators have
opined that the decision may have deleterious effects on some states' tort reform
laws because the states previously allowed fraud-on-the-FDA claims in exchange

182. See Goodlin, 167 F.3d at 1380-81 (opining that there is no legislative history which makes
it plausible "to believe that Congress struck a... bargain-regulation in exchange for immunity from
state tort suits-in the area of medical devices").
183. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
184. See Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 914 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Michael v.
Shiley, Inc. in support of preempting plaintiff's fraud-on-the-FDA claim); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46
F.3d 1361, 1329 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's fraud-on-the-FDA claim was preempted);
Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 44 F.3d 300,306-07 (5th Cir. 1995) (refusing to create a fraud-on-the-FDA
exception based on the holding in King, and opining that the FDA is more than equipped to deal with
issues of fraud); see also Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216,235 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Michael
and Mitchell for the proposition that the plaintiff's fraud-on-the-FDA claim was preempted because
such a claim would create requirements that conflicted with federal law).
185. James V. Beck & John A. Valentine, Challengingthe Viability ofFDCA-Based Causes of
Action in the Tort Context: The OrthopedicBone Screw Experience,55 FOOD &DRuGL.J. 389,430
(2000).
186. See, e.g., Eric G. Lasker, The Buck Stops Here: ProductLiability ClaimsInvolving FDARegulatedProducts,U.S. L. WK. 2755, 2756 (2001) ("A jury is not guided by th[e] same balancing
of regulatory objectives, and even if it were, it would not balance the objectives in the same way as
the FDA.").
187. Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 28-30 (lst Cir. 1995) (holding that creating
exceptions for noncompliance would disturb the uniformity in standards that Congress intended and
that the FDA is best equipped to determine if violations of the MDA have occurred).
188. Rebecca Porter, Supreme CourtRules ThatSuitforFraudon FederalAgencyIs Preempted,
TRIAL, Apr. 2001, at 17, 82.
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for limiting other types of tort suits.'8 9 However, as previously discussed, fraud-onthe-FDA claims were preempted well before the decision in Buckman came
along.'90 Additionally, the Court in Buckman said nothing about other state tort law
claims being preempted, so the decision's effect on these other claims will be
determined in the lower courts. Several courts have already addressed these issues.
VII.

POST-BUCKMAN

A. Lower Court Treatment ofBuckman
After analyzing Buckman, it is difficult to determine whether state law claims
other than fraud-on-the-FDA claims will be preempted, especially when they are
related to design, manufacturing, warnings, or labeling. Some scholars have opined
that claims based on improper labeling may also be preempted because they "would
require ajury to second-guess a specific regulatory determination in which the FDA
dictated the conduct alleged to be tortious."' 9 ' Recent case law demonstrates how
lower courts are handling this issue.
Globetti v. Sandoz PharmaceuticalCorp. presents a good example of how
lower courts are applying the Buckman decision to other state tort claims.192 In
Globetti, the defendant attempted to use the holding in Buckman to argue that all
of the plaintiffs claims involved communications with the FDA and thus were
preempted.' 93 The district court reasoned that the Buckman decision involved only
"fraud-on-the agency" and thus did not preclude the assertion of theories of
liability.' 94 The court stated that "[a]lthough Buckman precludes a plaintiff from
seeking damages because the defendant lied to the FDA, it is something completely
different to contend that plaintiff is precluded from seeking damages for injuries
due to lies to her."' 95 Additionally, the court held that Buckman did not preempt the
plaintiffs failure-to-warn claims:
In the case before the court, plaintiffs claims also do not arise
"solely from the violation of the FDCA requirements." Defendant
owed separate duties beyond simply full and fair disclosure to the
FDA, duties not to market a defective and unreasonably
dangerous product, not to misrepresent or suppress the facts

189. Id. at 82 (quoting Arnold Levin, plaintiffs' attorney, for the proposition that some "'tort
"reform" statutes may be invalid"'); see also Mary A. Zendran, Select Recent CourtDecisions,27 AM.
J.L. &MED. 351,352 (2001) ("This ruling could also have the unintended consequence ofinvalidating
tort-reform laws in several states.").
190. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
191. Lasker, supra note 186, at 2756.
192. Globetti v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. CV98-TMP-2649-S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2391
(N.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 2001).
193. Id. at *2-3.
194. Id. at *3-4.
195. Id. at *4-5.
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needed by physicians and consumers to assess the safety of the
product, and to adequately warn of known risks associated with
it. These duties existed irrespective of the FDCA. Thus, while
plaintiff cannot recover simply because defendant defrauded a
federal agency, nothing in Buckman suggests that she cannot
recover where the misrepresentations or suppression were directed
at her (through her physician) or when the warning given (even
though FDA approved) inadequately disclosed the hazards of the
product.19 6
Finally, the court cited Goodlin v. Medtronic,Inc. for the proposition that state
common law claims are not preempted by the FDCA or the MDA. 97 Therefore, the
Buckman decision did not preclude all state law claims, and it appears to be strictly
complied with as related to fraud-on-the-FDA claims only.
In Dawson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., the plaintiffs filed a class action complaint
against the manufacturer of the drug Ritalin for allegedly creating a market for the
drug while downplaying its risks.'98 The court found that the plaintiffs' complaint
did not rest solely on federal law, and thus the plaintiffs' claims were "traditional
state law tort and fraud claims."'199 The court did not imply preemption as the
Supreme Court had done in Buckman because in this case, the plaintiffs' complaint
did not rest on fraud on the FDA, but rather on fraud committed by the defendants
on the public." 0 The court stated that "Buckman thus clarified that traditional state
tort law claims (even those which parallel FDCA requirements) are not necessarily
preempted by the FDCA and are not necessarily the same as 'fraud on the FDA'
type claims."2 '' Further, the court noted that a violation of the FDCA was not a
necessary element ofthe plaintiffs' claims, which relied on traditional state law tort
and fraud principles.22 Thus, DawsoncircumscribedBuclnan's preemptive scope.
In Flynn v. American Home ProductsCorp., the plaintiff suffered a leaky heart
valve after using a diet drug, "fen-phen," and she sought relief based on fraudulent
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and under Minnesota's consumer
protection statutes." 3 According to the plaintiff, the defendant-manufacturer failed
to comply with FDA regulations that required disclosure of adverse drug
experiences.2" The Minnesota court, confronting the issue for the first time, applied
Buckman in holding that the existence of state law tort claims conflicted with the

196.
197.
198.
23, 2001).
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at *6.
Id. at *7; see supranote 172 and accompanying text.
Dawson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., No. 00-6162,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6869, at *3 (D.N.J. May
Id. at*11.
Id. at *20.
Id. at *21 (quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,353 (2001)).
Id.
Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342,345 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2002

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 673

FDA's authority to consistently police fraud." 5 The court stated that "the Buckman
Court's observation that 50 state-law causes of action for violation of the FDA's
detailed regulations would increase the burdens placed on applicants for FDA
approval applies to drug manufacturers as well as to medical-device
manufacturers."20 6 The court also noted that the state claims, including the
fraudulent misrepresentation claim, would fail under Minnesota law if there were
no preemption, reasoning that there was no fiduciary duty or intent that the
plaintiffs rely on the representations. 7
It appears that lower courts are currently in agreement that Buckman did not
preclude all state law tort claims, but that it will be strictly complied with when
fraud-on-the-FDA claims are advanced."' Other courts interpreting medical
preemption clauses related to the FDA have reached results similar to those
previously discussed." 9 Moreover, still other courts have looked to Buckman for
guidance when considering claims not related to medical devices or the FDA. 1 0

205. Id. at 347, 349.
206. Id. at 349.
207. Id. at 349-50.
208. See, e.g., Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., No. 96-CV-4113-JPG, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15568, at *55 (S.D. I1l. Sept. 4,2001) (stating that"Buckman'sspecific holding, narrowly read, is not
controlling" in the pharmaceutical context as to warning claims).
209. See, e.g., Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., No. 00-15279, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17223, at *5
n. 1 (9th Cir. Aug. 1,2001) (Plaintiff brought a fraud-on-the-FDA claim on appeal, but conceded that
under Buckman, the fraud claim was not valid.); Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 00-2556,2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 15408, at *21 n.3 (4th Cir. July 9, 2001) (relying on Buckman and rejecting the
plaintiff's fraud-on-the-FDA claim); Fitzgerald v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 00-1145, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 12853, at * 10 n.3 (4th Cir. June 12,2001) (Plaintiff alleged that the defendant committed
fraud-on-the-FDA but conceded that the decision in Buckman precluded her claim.); Andrx Pharms.,
Inc. v. Biovail Corp., No. 01-6194-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16904, at *18
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2001) (holding that plaintiffs' claims for "deceptive and unfair practices,"
"tortious interference," and "negligence per se" were preempted under the FDCA and Buckman);
Caraker, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15568, at *35-36 (using implied preemption and Buckman to hold
that plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims were not preempted).
210. See, e.g., Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 245 F.3d 214, 223 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001)
(distinguishing Buckman in determining that the plaintiffs were not alleging fraud-on-the-agency
claims, but rather were asserting "violations of state and federal securities laws"); Morgan v. Brush
Wellman, Inc., No. 3:94-CV-369, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14072, at *4748 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4,2001)
(relying on Buckman when analogizing between the FDA's balancing of objectives in determining
fraud against the agency and "the [Department of Energy's] ...balanc[ing of] policy objectives
including economics and national security needs");In reBridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Nos. IP 00-9373CB-S, MDL 1373, 2001 WL 876385, at *9 (S.D. Ind.July 27,2001) (citing Buckman for support in
holding that plaintiffs' product recall claim was preempted under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act
because plaintiffs cannot rely on express preemption provisions or saving clauses); McCall v.
Pacificare of California, Inc., 21 P.3d 1189, 1199 n.9 (Cal. 2001) (discussing the Medicare Act and
stating that "[t]o the extent the [plaintiffs'] complaint alleges fraud on the [Health Care Financing
Administration], defendants may, on remand, assert it is preempted under the rule in Buckman");
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, No. 89492,2001 11. LEXIS 1039, at * 15-16 (Il1.Aug. 16, 2001) (citing
Buckman for the proposition that the court would not rule out implied preemption under the Federal
Boat Safety Act).
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B. The CurrentPreemptionPosition
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has shifted between an express
preemption approach and an implied preemption approach.2 ' One commentator
concluded that the "consequence of the Supreme Court's failure to harmonize
Cipollone and Geierwill be a bumper crop of conflicting decisions brought about
by the inability of courts to determine in a consistent way whether the polar
magnetic field of express preemption clauses, or that of savings clauses, is the
stronger." 212 However, the Buckman Court quoted Geier for the proposition that
express preemption and saving clauses will not bar an implied preemption
analysis. 213 Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court is teetering toward implied
preemption."'
In Carakerv. Sandoz PharmaceuticalsCorp., an inadequate warnings claim
was brought against a pharmaceutical company, and the court ruled out express
preemption because Congress did not provide a preemption provision for
pharmaceuticals under the FDCA21 5 . In the court's opinion, congress' failure to
provide such a provision was "some evidence against congressional intent to scrap
almost the entire scheme for state law products liability cases based on failure to
warn." 216 Additionally, the court reasoned that the presumption against preemption
applied because the giving of "warnings as to the risks of ingesting dangerous
prescription drugs" was an area of state concern.2" 7
However, one must not lose sight of each specific federal statute and the
different avenues each court can use to interpret the statute's express preemptive
provision, provided there even is such a provision. Two Supreme Court decisions
rendered subsequent to Buckman illustrate this point 1 s. Even though these cases are
not products liability actions, the Court utilizes the same analysis to determine
whether state claims will be preempted. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the
Court considered a claim brought by cigarette manufacturers, cigar manufacturers
andretailers, and manufacturers of smokeless tobacco products against the Attorney
General of Massachusetts alleging that regulations restricting retail sales
transactions, promotion, and labeling of tobacco products were preempted.2" 9 The
Court's analysis of the express language of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and

211. See supra Part III.
212. See Madden, supra note 54, at 158.
213. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. at 341, 352 (2001) (quoting Geier v.
Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)).
214. See OWEN ETAL., supranote 1,at 71 ("Post-Geiercases seem to be embracing the implied
preemption analysis employed there.").
215. Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., No. 96-CV-4113-JPG, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 15568, at*4243 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 4,2001).
216. Id. at *43.
217. Id. at *57 (citing Bucknan, 531 U.S. at 348).
218. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001); Egelhoffv. EgelhoffBreiner, 532
U.S. 141 (2001).
219. LorillardTobacco Co., 121 S. Ct. at 2410-12.
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Advertising Act 20 and of congressional intent was almost identical to the analysis
used in Cipollone.221 The Court held that the state regulations were preempted
because they targeted cigarette advertising, but conceded that "[s]tates remain free
to enact generally applicable zoning regulations, and to regulate conduct with
respect to cigarette use and sales."' Further, the Court stated that "Congress
preempted state cigarette advertising regulations like the Attorney General's
because they would upset federal legislative choices to require specific warnings
and to impose the ban on cigarette advertising in electronic media in order to
address concerns about smoking and health."2"
224 the Court considered preemption with respect
InEgelhoffv. EgelhoffBreiner,
to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).225 The Court held that
the plaintiffs' claims were impliedly preempted because the state statute at issue
concerned areas of ERISA, reasoning that uniformity among the states would be
impossible "if plans [were] subject to different legal obligations in different
States. ' ' 26 The Court conceded that family law is typically an area of state concern,
thus creating a presumption against preemption, but held "that presumption [could]
be overcome where, as here, Congress ha[d] made clear its desire for preemption." 27
Based on the most recent Supreme Court decisions and on those preceding
them, it is difficult to determine exactly where federal preemption exists postBuckman. As evidenced by Buckman and Geier,implied preemption is very much
alive? 8 However, as demonstrated in Lorillard Tobacco Co. and Egelhoff, the
Court is willing to expressly preempt state statutes or regulations that conflict with
federal statutes. 2 9 Congressional intent and the history underlying the enactment of
the statute or regulation are paramount in an express preemption analysis, especially
when attempting to determine whether Congress intended to provide plaintiffs with
no recourse in the products liability context.230 Because Congress did not choose the
same express language for each preemptive statute and because it had different
motivations for enacting each statute, a thorough analysis of each preemptive
provision is required. Similarly, when a saving clause exists, as in Geier,the courts
must determine whether the clause will bar an express preemption analysis and will

220. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
221. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 121 S. Ct. at 2414-17; see supra Part III.A.
222. LorillardTobacco Co., 121 S. Ct. at 2419. The state regulations at issue set "restrictions
on outdoor advertising, point-of-sale advertising, retail sales transactions, transactions by mail,
promotions, sampling of products, and labels for cigars." Id. at 2410-Il.
223. Id. at 2419.
224. 532 U.S. 141 (2001). Egelhoff involved a dispute over a state statute that allegedly
eliminated the defendant as a beneficiary of an insurance policy. Id. at 144.
225. See 29 U.S.C. § I 144(a) (1994) (stating that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan").
226. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148.
227. Id. at 151.
228. See supra Parts III.C, V.
229. See supra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part VI.B.
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instead leave at most the possibility of implied preemption.' As evinced in
Buckman, the type of claim alleged is also important when determining whether to
use an express or implied preemption analysis and whether a presumption against
preemption exists3 2 In sum, the patchwork Supreme Court decisions appear to
require a case-by-case analysis to determine whether express or implied preemption
principles apply to a particular state law claim in relation to a particular federal
statute or regulation.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Federal preemption is a difficult issue because of the delicate balance that has
been struck between federal and state powers, especially when related to areas
where states have traditionally governed, such as health and safety. The Supreme
Court has provided some insight and much confusion for analyzing preemption
within the products liability context, beginning with Cipolloneand continuing with
its recent decision inBuckman. The Court's decisions have created a split within the
circuit courts that have endeavored to determine whether federal preemption
principles differ for medical devices that are approved as substantially equivalent,
as investigational devices, or as PMA devices. 3
In Buckman, the Court shed a fraction of light on this confusion. Buckman
essentially applied an implied preemption analysis in determining that the plaintiffs'
fraud-on-the-FDA claims were preempted. This decision comported with previous
circuit courts' decisions." 4 However, the debate as to whether PMA devices were
specific requirements sufficient to trigger preemption was not clarified. Combining
the reasoning of the courts in Goodlin and Kennedy with both congressional and
regulatory iptent suggests that the PMA does not qualify as a specific requirement
under the FDCAY5 It does not seem likely that Congress intended to provide
plaintiffs with no recourse for their injuries. Lower courts grappling with Buckman
have strictly construed its holding in determining that state law claims other than
fraud-on-the-FDA will not be preempted. 6 Therefore, at best, Buckman clarifies
only claims related to fraud-on-the-FDA, and we must wait for yet another Supreme
Court decision or for congressional action to illuminate the ongoing confusion that
underlies federal preemption. The Supreme Court may soon get another chance. 7
Trent Kirk

231. See supranotes 58-59 and accompanying text.
232. See supranotes 143-47 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 151, 154 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Part VII.A.
237. See Motorboats: US. Supreme Court Asked to Settle Propeller Guard Preemption
Question, BNA PROD. LIAB. DAILY, Dec. 13, 2001, availableat WL 12/13/2001 PLD d3.
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